Saturday 14 May 2011

"Torture Can be Wrong and Still Work". Steven Carter in the "Daily Beast"

Torture is wrong for all sorts of reasons, from its affront to basic human dignity to its violation of fundamental human rights. Making a moral case is not difficult.

So says Steven Carter in 11 May's Daily Beast (a left-of centre site).

But perhaps it's “not too difficult” to make the moral case only if you take a one-eyed view: from the point of view of the perpetrator and not the victim, from the POV of the enemy, not the friend.

The rights of perpetrator vs those of the victim

Take the case mentioned, that of Magnus Gäfgen. 

Back in 2002, Gäfgen kidnapped an 11-year-old boy, Jakob von Metzler, whom he then murdered. Without disclosing that Jakob was dead, Gäfgen demanded a ransom of €1 million from the child’s wealthy parents. He collected the ransom, and was arrested soon after. The police, who thought Jakob was still alive, demanded to know where he was hidden. Gäfgen refused to say. According to Gäfgen’s lawsuit, they beat him, then told him a torture specialist was being flown in, a man whose training would enable him to “inflict more pain on me than I had ever experienced.” At that point he confessed, telling the police that the boy was dead and where his body could be found.

Steven Carter says that this shows torture can work and that therefore the argument that it doesn’t work “eventually sounds silly”.  Having removed that argument against torture, he then falls back on the one that he says is “not difficult” to make: the moral case.

But is the moral case really so easy to make?

Let’s imagine that Jakob had been found alive, and only because of the torture of Gäfgen.  Would Carter now argue that that torture had been "morally wrong"?  Would he maintain that the “human dignity” of the murderer Gäfgen should have trumped that of the victim, young Jakob?  That the human rights of Gäfgen had been more grossly “violated” than those of Jakob?

Let’s use the common sense test: what parent, what decent human being, could object to Jakob’s being found alive, even if finding him alive were only possible if Gäfgen suffered “more pain than he had ever experienced”? If the failure to deliver said pain had meant the death of Jakob, what common-sensical person, what parent, would gainsay its use? [*]

I used to be full-square against torture.  It’s wrong, no ifs not buts.  But there are “buts” and there are “ifs”.  One “but” is the one Carter points out: “but it sometimes works”.  One “if’ is “what would you do if…?”.  What would you do if your 10-year old daughter, your 11-year old Jakob, were kidnapped and if you had the kidnapper in your hands?  What would you do?  Would you read him his Rights?  Would you consult the international treaties on non-use of torture?  Or would you rough him up?  How far would you go, to get the information to find your child alive?

In other words, I’m not so sure that even the moral case is as easy to make as Carter suggests, not when one is confronted with real world choices.

I’m well aware of the arguments against torture: inter alia that it’s a slippery slope, if one starts it, where does one stop?  And that the law has to be clear and unambiguous; it cannot allow grey areas for therein lurks the potential for sadistic evil. Those are fair comments and reasonable concerns.  But do they, of themselves, invalidate the facts that not only does it sometimes work, but also that the moral case rests with the “dignity” and the “human rights” of the victim and not with the perpetrator of a crime?  The law is never 100% clear and unambiguous: that’s why we have courts, judges, and – shudder – lawyers.

The rights of the enemy vs those of the friend

What of war?  What of enemy vs. friend?  When we are in war allowed the use of lethal force against the enemy, why is it so “morally” wrong to consider “pain” instead of death?

I remember as a kid asking my Dad his experiences in Papua New Guinea, where he served in World War II, as an Army Intelligence officer, interrogating Japanese prisoners of war.  Our Dad was one of the very few officers in the Australian army who spoke Japanese fluently.

Like all kids with Dads who'd served in that war, we used to ask him about his experiences, and especially about the interrogations.  One of the questions we young kids asked – we couldn’t help it really – was “Dad, did you ever torture the prisoners?”.  Now, I’m not sure whether we hoped the answer would be “yes” (shiver of horror/excitement?...) or that it would be “no”.  


In any case the answer was this: that Japanese soldiers were very tough and brave and were expected to prevail or die in battle.  They were not expected to be captured alive.  Therefore they did not have the “name, rank and serial number” ethos of the allied armies.  Once captured they were pliable and ready with any information they could give, which he said was often useful –the deployment of forward troops, for example.  


Every now and then, though, they had one who held out for a bit.  “What did you do then?” we asked, shivering in anticipation.  Well, he said, he just made them stand in the corner of the room till they had to go the toilet (the “bathroom”, for my American readers).  They were so embarrassed by the thought of spoiling themselves in public, the concept of “shame” so ingrained in the Japanese psyche, that they would tell all, in order to be let out. Our kids' sense of fair play thought that pretty fair; a reasonable amount of "force", if you will, to gain critical intelligence.

But what would be thought of even that level of inquisition today?  Would it be thought that the “dignity” of the soldier had been impugned by making him "hold it in"?  That his “human rights” violated by not being allowed a bathroom visit?  Even when the information so gained, saved Aussie soldiers’ lives; and when just before capture we had been trying to kill the, now, prisoner?


In short, I think the absolute prohibition of torture, with no ifs, no buts, is a position one can only hold if that proposition remains unexamined.

[*] Postscript: I note that I’ve written the above as if the POS child murderer Gäfgen had actually been subject to “more pain than he had ever experienced”.  But on re-reading I note that he was only threatened with it, before he gave up the body. So not only is he an odious child killer, but also a coward.